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LIBERTY’S FORGOTTEN REFUGEES? 
ENGENDERING ASSEMBLY 
SUSAN FRELICH APPLETON

 
John Inazu‘s impressive book, Liberty’s Refuge: The Forgotten 
Freedom of Assembly,
1
 interweaves two projects. First, it critiques the 
Supreme Court‘s development of the freedom of association. Second, it 
makes the case for reviving the freedom of assembly in order to strengthen 
constitutional protection for the rights of groups, in particular, groups‘ 
―right to exclude.‖2 Many aspects of Professor Inazu‘s arguments no doubt 
strike some readers as promising, while other readers will find them 
provocative. 
A thorough review of Liberty’s Refuge lies beyond the scope of this 
essay, which has a very limited objective: to consider a few examples 
illustrating the additional insights that a feminist lens might bring to the 
analysis. Consistent with my modest agenda, the lens that I use is a very 
elementary one, without refractions reflecting the many variations in 
feminist theory.
3
 Instead, this essay undertakes merely what Katharine 
Bartlett once called ―ask[ing] the woman question.‖4 
With this objective in mind, I have selected three specific issues: 
Professor Inazu‘s treatment of the always-contested divide between public 
and private, his overly narrow reading of the Supreme Court‘s intimate 
association doctrine, and his failure to distinguish exclusion from 
subordination. Although asking the woman question illuminates some of 
what is absent from Professor Inazu‘s analysis, I offer these comments 
with both collegial enthusiasm for his scholarship and commitment to 
―engaging‖ with the ideas that Liberty’s Refuge sets forth.5  
 
 
   Lemma Barkeloo & Phoebe Couzins Professor of Law, Washington University. The 
inspiration for the second part of the title of this essay comes from Martha Minow, The Supreme 
Court, 1986 Term—Foreword: Justice Engendered, 101 HARV. L. REV. 10 (1987). I appreciate the 
thoughtful comments of Deborah Dinner and Melissa Murray on earlier drafts and the cheerful support 
of John Inazu in my examination of his ideas. 
 1. JOHN D. INAZU, LIBERTY‘S REFUGE: THE FORGOTTEN FREEDOM OF ASSEMBLY (2012). 
 2. See id. at 9–10, 166; see also id. at 181 (noting how ―forced inclusion of unwanted members 
unquestionably alters the content of [an organization‘s] expression‖). 
 3. See generally, e.g., MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY (2d 
ed. 2003). 
 4. Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HARV. L. REV. 829, 837–49 (1990). 
 5. This essay stems from my comments as a panelist at the conference ―Engaging Liberty’s 
Refuge,‖ on March 2, 2012, at Washington University School of Law. 
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I. OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE 
Professor Inazu offers the following definition of the constitutional 
right he seeks to recover: 
The right of assembly is a presumptive right of individuals to form 
and participate in peaceable, noncommercial groups. The right is 
rebuttable when there is a compelling reason for thinking that the 
justifications for protecting assembly do not apply (as when the 
group prospers under monopolistic or near-monopolistic 
conditions).
6
  
When claiming this right for groups, Professor Inazu asserts a clear divide 
between public and private. Accordingly, organizations like the Jaycees
7
 
and Boy Scouts
8
 should be able to invoke the freedom of assembly 
because they are ―private groups,‖ not ―public accommodations.‖9 Thus, 
he criticizes the Supreme Court‘s reliance on freedom of association in 
Roberts v. Jaycees
10
 and its decision that the organization must allow 
women to become full members, despite more exclusive gender-based 
rules.
11
 Although Professor Inazu supports the outcome in Boy Scouts of 
America v. Dale,
12
 in which the Court permitted the exclusion of an openly 
gay scoutmaster, he disagrees with aspects of the Court‘s approach, 
including its reliance on expressive association
13
 and its failure to question 
whether the Boy Scouts may properly be classified as a public 
accommodation under New Jersey law.
14
 
 Despite the clarity that Professor Inazu attributes to the distinction 
between private groups and public accommodations, as he understands 
these categories, he ignores—and thus completely erodes—any 
public/private dichotomy when he turns his attention to asserted 
infringements of rights by the state. In two cases against which he takes 
particularly sharp aim, Christian Legal Society (CLS) v. Martinez
15
 and 
Chi Iota v. City University of New York,
16
 the alleged violations of the 
 
 
 6. INAZU, supra note 1, at 14, 166. 
 7. See Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 8. See Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 9. INAZU, supra note 1, at 165, 168, 183. 
 10. 468 U.S. 609 (1984).  
 11. INAZU, supra note 1, at 132–43, 174–84. 
 12. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 13. INAZU, supra note 1, at 143–44. 
 14. Id. at 168. 
 15. 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). 
 16. 502 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2007). 
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freedom of assembly arose from the failure of the schools in question, both 
state institutions, to provide affirmative support for exclusive groups, 
whose membership rules conflicted with the schools‘ policies of 
nondiscrimination. Thus, for example, in Martinez, the Court upheld the 
decision of Hastings College of the Law (a division of the University of 
California) to withhold benefits such as funding and the use of its logo 
from an organization that refused to accept members who did not share its 
beliefs about religion and sexual activities, in violation of the school‘s 
―acceptance of all comers‖ policy for officially recognized student 
groups.
17
 In explaining this result, the majority observed that, although the 
―First Amendment shields CLS against state prohibition of the 
organization‘s expressive activity, . . . CLS enjoys no constitutional right 
to state subvention of its selectivity.‖18 Similarly, in Chi Iota, the court 
reasoned that the refusal of the public university
19
 ―to subsidize the [male-
only] Fraternity‘s activities does not constitute a substantial imposition on 
the group‘s associational freedom.‖20 
Professor Inazu‘s vision for protecting groups‘ freedom to determine 
their membership is one that privileges such organizations‘ private 
preferences even as it demands the support of public institutions. For 
example, when criticizing Martinez and Chi Iota, Professor Inazu alludes 
only briefly to the issue of state subsidization, emphasizing instead the 
importance of public support to the exercise of private groups‘ protected 
First Amendment right:  
Sometimes a group must choose between receiving benefits and 
adhering to its policies at the cost of those benefits. But withholding 
some benefits (like access to meeting space or e-mail lists or the 
opportunity to be part of a public forum) can be akin to stamping 
out a group‘s existence. After Martinez, the Hastings Christian 
Group That Accepts All Comers can exist, and Christian Legal 
Society for Hastings Law Students That Can Sometimes Meet on 
Campus as a Matter of University Discretion if Space Is Available 
but Can‘t Recruit Members at the Student Activities Fair can exist. 
But the Hastings Christian Legal Society—whose views and 
 
 
 17. 130 S. Ct. at 2979. 
 18. Id. at 2978. 
 19. 502 F.3d at 138. 
 20. Id. at 148. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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purposes are in no way sanctioned by and able to be explicitly 
disavowed by Hastings—cannot.21 
Professor Inazu‘s assumption of a permenable boundary between 
public institutions and private groups omits reference to an extensive 
feminist literature on the would-be public/private divide. Feminist legal 
theorists have long challenged this purported distinction and its resulting 
subordination of women, with family law‘s insistence on a ―private 
realm‖22 emerging as a recurring theme in such scholarship.23 Yet, for me, 
asking the woman question about Professor Inazu‘s conceptualization of 
the freedom of assembly calls to mind, first and foremost, the Supreme 
Court‘s abortion-funding cases.24 These cases held that even constitutional 
rights recognized as fundamental
25
 do not give rise to entitlements to state 
support, even when such state support is necessary to permit exercise of 
the right.
26
 Thus, even if the absence of support would extinguish for 
indigent women practical realization of the right to choose abortion, the 
state can express its own anti-abortion value judgments in how it directs 
its funding.
27
 In clearly signaling its understanding of abortion as a 
negative right,
28
 the Court invoked additional examples to make the point, 
observing that the parental right to choose private schooling for one‘s 
children does not require state-subsidized tuition.
29
 Later cases have 
 
 
 21. INAZU, supra note 1, at 149. 
 22. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944). 
 23. E.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A THEORY OF DEPENDENCY 
(2004); Nadine Taub & Elizabeth M. Schneider, Women’s Subordination and the Role of Law, in THE 
POLITICS OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRITIQUE 328 (David Kairys ed., 3d ed. 1998); Frances Olsen, The 
Myth of State Intervention in the Family, 18 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 835 (1985); Robin West, From Choice 
to Reproductive Justice: De-Constitutionalizing Abortion Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 1394, 1416 (2009). 
Indeed, Professor Inazu devotes considerable attention to the American suffragists in the early 
twentieth century (e.g., INAZU, supra note 1, at 44–45) without acknowledging how their movement to 
obtain the vote, at bottom, constituted a frontal attack on women‘s subordination effectuated through 
the constructs of coverture and the traditional private sphere. See Reva Siegel, She the People, 115 
HARV. L. REV. 947 (2002). 
 24. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). 
 25. At the time the abortion-funding cases were decided, a majority of the Court classified the 
choice to terminate a pregnancy as a fundamental right, subject to strict constitutional scrutiny. See 
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973). 
 26. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316–17. Similarly, the state is under no obligation to support a woman‘s 
decision to carry a pregnancy to term. See Susan Frelich Appleton, When Welfare Reforms Promote 
Abortion: “Personal Responsibility,” “Family Values,” and the Right to Choose, 85 GEO. L.J. 155 
(1996). 
 27. Harris, 448 U.S. at 314–15; Maher, 432 U.S. at 474. 
 28. Susan Frelich Appleton, Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributions of the 
Abortion-Funding Cases to Fundamental-Rights Analysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 
COLUM. L. REV. 721, 734 (1981).  
 29. Harris, 448 U.S. at 318. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/7
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underscored the Court‘s steadfast preference for interpreting constitutional 
guarantees as negative rights, affording no claim to affirmative 
governmental support.
30
 Put differently, Martinez, Chi Iota, and the 
abortion-funding cases are consistent in their treatment of constitutional 
rights, state value judgments, and public support. 
Professor Inazu fails to explain why he assumes the freedom of 
assembly constitutes a positive right that compels state support, such as 
funding for the CLS from Hastings College of the Law or use of the 
school‘s logo.31 Just as withholding financial support from abortion 
provides a way for a state to express its value judgment ―to favor normal 
childbirth,‖32 Hastings, a public school operating as an arm of the state, 
made funding decisions that expressed its anti-discrimination values. At 
the same time, the negative right enjoyed by CLS protected its ability to 
assemble free from interference by the state.
33
 
Certainly, I can imagine arguments contending that the abortion-
funding cases do not control in disputes about the freedom of assembly. 
Textual distinctions offer one basis, given that the abortion-funding cases 
invoked the Fourteenth Amendment, which protects against ―deprivations‖ 
of liberty,
34
 while the freedom of assembly finds its source in the First 
Amendment, which permits ―no law‖ on listed matters.35 Doctrinal 
complexities—from principles governing public fora36 to an intricate web 
of precedents on ―unconstitutional conditions‖37—could provide additional 
openings. Yet, Liberty’s Refuge pursues no such path, instead noting that 
the distinction between public and private remains elusive
38
 and then 
 
 
 30. See Town of Castle Rock, Colo. v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748 (2005); DeShaney v. Winnebago 
Cnty. Dep‘t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989). 
 31. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Situating CLS v. Martinez, 38 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 543, 555–58 
(2011). 
 32. Maher, 432 U.S. at 477. 
 33. Interesting questions arise about where noninterference ends and state support begins. 
Hastings permitted CLS to use school facilities for its meetings and activities and to post 
announcements on its chalkboards and bulletin boards. 130 S. Ct. 2971, 2981 (2010). And, of course, 
even if the group were to meet exclusively in private homes, it would benefit from some state services, 
such as public utilities and police protection. References to such line-drawing have arisen in the 
context of abortion as a negative right. See Webster v. Reprod. Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 523–24 
(1989) (O‘Connor, concurring in part); see also INAZU, supra note 1, at 123 (discussing Gilmore v. 
City of Montgomery, 417 U.S. 556, 574 (1974), and its suggestion that even negative rights might 
require use of ―generalized governmental services,‖ such as electricity and water). 
 34. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 35. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 36. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
 37. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1415 
(1989). 
 38. See INAZU, supra note 1, at 17, 110–11. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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suggesting that making the case for freedom of assembly suffices to make 
the case for state subsidies and support.
39
  
Nonetheless, asking the woman question about the woman question 
that Professor Inazu overlooks reveals a possible upside: perhaps Professor 
Inazu‘s willingness to blur public and private could help achieve reforms 
for which several feminist scholars have called. Examples of such reforms 
include more vigorous state protections from family violence,
40
 state 
assistance in exercising reproductive choices,
41
 state support for 
caregiving,
42
 and state recognition of nontraditional family or intimate 
relationships
43—not to mention better appreciation for the inextricability 
of the state from the ―private realm.‖44 Read broadly, Professor Inazu‘s 
seamless move from private rights to public support could spark new 
conversations about such matters. 
II. OF INTIMATE ASSOCIATIONS 
Liberty’s Refuge contends that First Amendment case law went wrong 
when it developed the doctrine of freedom of association, in particular the 
branch protecting ―intimate association,‖ which has failed to respect the 
freedom to exclude that Professor Inazu would find in the Assembly 
Clause.
45
 According to one possible reading, Professor Inazu is simply 
advocating a supplement to the freedom of association. Under a more 
plausible reading of his book, however, Professor Inazu wants a ―do over,‖ 
that is, a slate cleansed of existing precedent on freedom of association 
and its limits so that a new jurisprudence of assembly can take its place.
46
 
Hence, asking the woman question requires considering what it would 
 
 
 39. Id. at 149. 
 40. See, e.g., Jane Aiken & Katherine Goldwasser, The Perils of Empowerment, 20 CORNELL J. 
L. & PUB. POL‘Y 139 (2010); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Substantive Equality: A Perspective, 96 MINN. 
L. REV. 1, 13–15 (2011). 
 41. See, e.g., Catharine A. MacKinnon, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in FEMINISM 
UNMODIFIED 93 (1987); West, supra note 23, at 1409. 
 42. See, e.g., FINEMAN, supra note 23. 
 43. See, e.g., NANCY D. POLIKOFF, BEYOND (STRAIGHT AND GAY) MARRIAGE: VALUING ALL 
FAMILIES UNDER THE LAW (2008). 
 44. See, e.g., Olsen, supra note 23. 
 45. INAZU, supra note 1, at 132–49. 
 46. Cf. Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 527–28 (1999) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (expressing surprise 
but interest in the majority‘s reliance on the Fourteenth Amendment‘s Privileges or Immunities 
Clause, given ―the current disarray of our Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence‖ and the possibility 
that decisions under this clause might ―displace, rather than augment, portions of our equal protection 
and substantive due process jurisprudence‖). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol89/iss6/7
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mean for the Court to scrap intimate association and, with it, all that this 
freedom has meant in the struggle for legal feminism and gender equality.  
Against this background, the Court‘s privacy cases about contraception 
emerge as paradigmatic. Professor Inazu seems willing to accept the first 
of these cases, Griswold v. Connecticut,
47
 which in 1965 stated that 
association ―involve[s] more than the ‗right of assembly,‘‖48 described 
marriage as an intimate association,
49
 and held that penumbras of several 
different constitutional guarantees protect a right of privacy encompassing 
married couples‘ use of contraceptives.50 By contrast, Professor Inazu 
directs especially harsh criticism at Griswold‘s sequel, Eisenstadt Baird,51 
in which the Court invoked Griswold and the Equal Protection Clause to 
identify the privacy right at stake as one concerning decisionmaking about 
life-altering choices, such as reproduction;
52
 to conclude that the right 
belongs to the individual;
53
 and to strike down a law criminalizing the 
distribution of contraceptives to unmarried persons.
54
 For Professor Inazu, 
Eisenstadt epitomizes the distortions worked by the Court‘s association 
doctrine. He quotes with approval H. Jefferson Powell, who wrote that 
Eisenstadt heralded ―the identification of a radically individualistic 
liberalism as the moral content of American constitutionalism.‖55 In 
condemning the transition from Griswold to Eisenstadt, Professor Inazu 
observes that ―[t]he right of privacy utterly detached from the right of 
association had no First Amendment basis; it came rather from the 
‗liberty‘ of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.‖56 
 
 
 47. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 48. Id. at 483. 
 49. The majority stated:  
Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the 
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony 
in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an 
association for as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions. 
Id. at 486. 
 50. Id. at 484–85. See INAZU, supra note 1, at 124–28. 
 51. 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 52. See id. at 453 (―If the right of privacy means anything, it is the right of the individual, 
married or single, to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.‖). 
 53. See id. (stating that ―the marital couple is not an independent entity with a mind and heart of 
its own, but an association of two individuals each with a separate intellectual and emotional 
makeup‖). 
 54. Id. at 454–55. 
 55. INAZU, supra note 1, at 128 (quoting H. JEFFERSON POWELL, THE MORAL TRADITION OF 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 176–77 (1993)). 
 56. INAZU, supra note 1, at 129. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Yet, issues of contraception necessarily and inherently implicate 
association. In other words, the right to privacy—as defined by the Court 
in Eisenstadt
57—cannot be ―detached‖ from the right of association. For 
women especially, contraception makes possible sexual association 
without what Eisenstadt conceptualized as the penalty of unwanted 
pregnancy.
58
 Indeed, pregnancy itself might well constitute the most 
intimate of associations,
59
 from which follows what we might understand 
as a ―right to exclude,‖ to borrow Professor Inazu‘s term60—a term that 
nicely captures one way to think about what contraception accomplishes in 
a quite physical sense.
61
 Of course, this right to exclude uniquely affects 
women. It should come as no surprise that Kenneth Karst‘s pivotal article 
on intimate association states that ―Eisenstadt is correctly seen as a case 
involving the status of women.‖62 
In the years since Eisenstadt, the freedom that it protects has reached 
farther, acquiring greater salience for men. With the official demise of 
most disadvantages based on illegitimacy
63
 as well as increasingly 
aggressive measures designed to impose and enforce child support 
obligations, in the name of personal responsibility,
64
 men now have a 
 
 
 57. See supra note 52 (quoting Eisenstadt). 
 58. See 405 U.S. at 448 (―It would be plainly unreasonable to assume that Massachusetts has 
prescribed pregnancy and the birth of an unwanted child as punishment for fornication. . . .‖); Sylvia 
A. Law, Homosexuality and the Social Meaning of Gender, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 187, 225 (noting 
affirmative interest in sexual expression while controlling reproduction). 
 59. See, e.g., Robin West, Jurisprudence and Gender, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1988). 
 60. See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
 61. Cf., e.g., EILEEN MCDONAGH, BREAKING THE ABORTION DEADLOCK: FROM CHOICE TO 
CONSENT (1996) (conceptualizing abortion as akin to self-defense, with the fetus as an active agent to 
whose intrusion the woman must consent). 
 62. Kenneth L. Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624, 676 (1980). Put 
differently, Eisenstadt stands out as an important case in its own right for women, even if one 
concludes that Eisenstadt is not a necessary step to recognizing the liberty and privacy protected in 
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003), which in turn struck down Texas‘s prohibition of same-sex 
sodomy, even when taking place in private spaces. Further, it remains an open question whether the 
holding and reasoning in Lawrence would provide direct support on the issue posed in Eisenstadt, 
namely, the constitutionality of the ban on the (public) distribution of contraceptives to unmarried 
individuals. See, e.g., Williams v. Morgan, 478 F.3d 1316, 1322 (11th Cir. 2007) (holding Lawrence 
inapplicable to Alabama‘s statute prohibiting the distribution and sale of sex toys). But see Carey v. 
Population Servs. Int‘l, 431 U.S. 678, 687–88 (1978) (analyzing restrictions on access to 
contraceptives under the same standard governing restrictions on use); Reliable Consultants, Inc. v. 
Earle, 517 F.3d 738, 744 (5th Cir. 2008) (citing Carey to conclude that Lawrence applies to Texas‘s 
statute prohibiting the distribution of sex toys). 
 63. See, e.g., Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988); Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 
(1972). 
 64. See, e.g., Susan Frelich Appleton, Illegitimacy and Sex, Old and New, 20 AM. U.J. GENDER, 
SOC. POL‘Y & L. 347, 360–64 (2012) (tracing current preoccupation with ―personal responsibility‖). 
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considerable stake in the availability of contraception.
65
 Of course, matters 
of paternity entail not only financial obligations but also the intimate 
association known as fatherhood, as various legal authorities have begun 
to recognize.
66
 This is so, according to case law, even if the man and child 
would never meet in person.
67
 
Exploring the woman question about access to contraception fills gaps 
in Professor Inazu‘s analysis. Even if intimate association fails to achieve 
all the protection that Professor Inazu seeks for group rights, this closer 
reading of Eisenstadt reveals that the doctrine he seems ready to scuttle 
safeguards valuable and substantial interests. Further, these are intensely 
personal and gendered interests that even a robust freedom of assembly 
would be unlikely to protect. 
III. OF EXCLUSION, INCLUSION, AND HIERARCHY 
Liberty’s Refuge posits a clash of constitutional values: equality versus 
group autonomy.
68
 As Professor Inazu describes the competing 
―constitutional visions,‖ they entail ―a radical sameness that destroys 
dissenting traditions or the destabilizing difference of a meaningful 
pluralism.‖69 When faced with cases about race-based discrimination in 
which the courts have chosen equality or ―radical sameness,‖ Professor 
Inazu seems ready to accept the current state of the law, with no call to 
turn back the clock. For example, Professor Inazu does not quarrel with 
the Supreme Court‘s 1976 ruling in Runyon v. McCrary,70 which required 
private schools to abandon racial segregation. Instead, he notes ―Runyon‘s 
symbolic importance‖ and comments that ―[f]ew people today believe that 
private schools ought to have a constitutional right to exclude African 
Americans.‖71  
When the issue changes from race-based discrimination to sex-based 
discrimination, however, Professor Inazu switches gears. In contrast to his 
approval, or at least tolerance, of the forced inclusion mandated by 
Runyon, Professor Inazu mounts an extended attack, including a ―missing 
 
 
 65. See, e.g., Dubay v. Wells, 506 F.3d 422 (6th Cir. 2007). 
 66. See, e.g., Rivera v. Minnich, 483 U.S. 574, 583–86 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); I. Glenn 
Cohen, The Right Not To Be a Genetic Parent?, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 1115, 1125 (2008) (positing the 
concept of ―attributional parenthood‖ that culture and society recognize apart from law). 
 67. See, e.g., A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000); Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 
(Tenn. 1992). 
 68. INAZU, supra note 1, at 148, 184. 
 69. Id. at 184. 
 70. 427 U.S. 160 (1976). 
 71. INAZU, supra note 1, at 123 (emphasis in original). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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dissent,‖ in response to the Supreme Court‘s ruling in Roberts v. Jaycees,72 
which held that the private organization in question must admit women as 
full members.  
By pointing out Professor Inazu‘s differing treatments of race-based 
and sex-based discrimination, I have already posed and addressed one 
version of the woman question. And, by extension, one can see related 
questions of gender arising from Professor Inazu‘s approval of Dale, 
which upheld the exclusion of gays from the Boy Scouts,
73
 and his 
criticism of Martinez, which validated the inclusion of gays and lesbians 
as a condition for state support.
74
  
Yet even beyond these issues, a closer look at Roberts reveals 
complexities that Professor Inazu‘s call for a right to exclude ignores. As 
the facts of Roberts show, the Jaycees did not exclude women entirely; 
rather, women were permitted to join the organization as associate 
members, who could not vote, hold office, or participate in leadership or 
awards programs—all opportunities open to ―regular‖ members.75 To the 
extent that Professor Inazu correctly states that ―association is itself a form 
of expression—[whom a group] selects as its members and leaders 
communicates a message,‖76 the message sent by the Jaycees was one of 
gender hierarchy. Including women in the group‘s activities would 
probably not alter the demographics, given that women were already 
associate members, but permitting women to join as full voting members 
might well produce different organizational politics and decisionmaking. 
From this perspective, the case does not raise the issue of a right to 
exclude, but instead the issue of a right to subordinate. The Court‘s 
references to ―dignity‖ in Roberts reinforce this interpretation.77  
 
 
 72. 468 U.S. 609 (1984); see also INAZU, supra note 1, at 174–84. 
 73. Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640 (2000). For further discussion of the case, see 
supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text. 
 74. Christian Legal Society v. Martinez, 130 S. Ct. 2971 (2010). For further discussion of the 
case, see supra notes 15–21 and accompanying text. 
 75. Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 613 (1984). True, older men were also confined to the 
inferior status, but the policy still discriminates. Cf., e.g., Geduldig v. Aiello, 429 U.S. 125, 162 & n.5 
(1976) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (repudiating the conclusion that singling out pregnancy for 
disadvantageous treatment does not constitute sex discrimination just because the one class 
encompasses ―nonpregnant persons,‖ both male and female). 
 76. INAZU, supra note 1, at 148. This analysis clearly has implications for an organization such 
as Hastings College of the Law, even though it is public, not private, as in Martinez. Hastings is 
engaging in expressive association when it excludes from official recognition and support 
organizations that do not welcome all students as members. This observation, in turn, leads back to the 
reasoning in the abortion-funding cases, that expenditures of public funds express state value 
judgments. See supra notes 24–30. 
 77. 468 U.S. at 625. 
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Recall Boy Scouts of America v. Dale,
78
 in which the Court upheld the 
organization‘s decision to exclude an openly gay scoutmaster on the 
theory that inclusion would contravene the Scouts‘ official position on 
homosexuality, given the group‘s expressive activity.79 As the Court 
explained, ―[t]he presence of an avowed homosexual and gay rights 
activist in an assistant scoutmaster‘s uniform sends a distinctly different 
message from the presence of a heterosexual assistant scoutmaster‖ even if 
the latter opposes the Scouts‘ anti-homosexuality policy.80 The Court 
continued: ―The Boy Scouts has a First Amendment right to choose to 
send one message but not the other.‖81  
Now, assume that the organization permitted gays to join and serve but 
confined them to secondary roles—something less than full Boy Scouts, 
perhaps Associate Boy Scouts. Then, the message conveyed would not 
simply be that the organization is limited and exclusive, but rather that it is 
hierarchical and that its message is clearly one about the inferiority of 
gays. This hypothetical would make the case parallel to Roberts v. 
Jaycees.
82
 It would also evoke comparisons to recent state and federal case 
law holding that confining same-sex couples to civil unions and domestic 
partnerships, while reserving marriage for different-sex couples, 
impermissibly demeans gays, lesbians, and their families by relegating 
them to a type of second-class citizenship.
83
  
Professor Inazu‘s treatment of Roberts does not grapple with such 
matters of hierarchy and subordination, which are classic aspects of the 
woman question. Nor does he explain why, in setting limits on the right to 
exclude, he would treat race-based discrimination differently from 
discrimination based on sex or sexual orientation.
84
 Yet, other scholars 
 
 
 78. 530 U.S. 640 (2000). 
 79. Id. at 655. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. at 656. 
 82. 468 U.S. 609 (1984). 
 83. See, e.g., In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384, 401, 433, 452 (Cal. 2008); Goodridge v. Dept. 
of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 964 (Mass. 2003); id. at 972 (Greaney, J., concurring); see also Perry 
v. Brown, 671 F.3d 1052, 1063 (9th Cir. 2012) (―Proposition 8 [which would eliminate same-sex 
marriage and return such couples to domestic partnerships] serves no purpose, and has no effect, other 
than to lessen the status and human dignity of gays and lesbians in California, and to officially 
reclassify their relationships and families as inferior to those of opposite-sex couples.‖). 
 84. See supra notes 70–74 and accompanying text. I suspect that Professor Inazu probably finds 
racial classifications arbitrary and largely irrelevant to group identity but sees some ―real differences‖ 
supporting classifications based on gender or sexual orientation. See Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex 
and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 955, 1004 (1984) (discussing Supreme Court doctrine on 
―real differences‖ in cases about sex and gender). Yet, in the context of the freedom of assembly, such 
generalizations reflect stereotyping that the Supreme Court has repudiated. See, e.g., Nevada Dept. of 
Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538 U.S. 721, 730 (2003) (emphasizing the impermissibility of gender 
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have recognized subordination as an often distinctive characteristic of sex- 
and gender-based discrimination, unlike some race-based discrimination.
85
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Liberty’s Refuge makes valuable contributions to our understanding of 
the freedom of assembly, group rights, and the antecedents and 
consequences of some of the Supreme Court‘s most notable opinions. By 
overlooking several opportunities to take gender into account, however, 
the book risks leaving women as liberty‘s forgotten refugees. Yet, making 
room for the woman question in the conversation that Professor Inazu has 
launched should advance his project and its goals. After all, the woman 
question is simply a question, inviting participants in the conversation to 
offer their own, sometimes dissenting, answers. 
 
 
stereotyping); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 135–36, 138–39 (1994) (noting 
similarities between race-based generalizations about jurors and condemning the striking of jurors 
based on gender stereotypes). Alternatively, Professor Inazu might see the history of slavery as 
meriting remedies that the history of gender oppression does not justify. But see DOROTHY ROBERTS, 
KILLING THE BLACK BODY: RACE REPRODUCTION, AND THE MEANING OF LIBERTY 22–55 (1997) 
(noting how even slavery oppressed women more than their male counterparts). See also NANCY F. 
COTT, PUBLIC VOWS: A HISTORY OF MARRIAGE AND THE NATION 61 (2000) (recounting historical 
justifications for slavery based on an analogy to marriage by citing beliefs that ―[j]ust as women were 
fitted by nature and God to conform to their place as wives, enslaved African Americans were suited 
for slavery, and slavery, like marriage, was a relationship of unequals benfiting both parties‖). 
 85. E.g., Mary E. Becker, Needed in the Nineties: Improved Individual and Structural Remedies 
for Racial and Sexual Disadvantages in Employment, 79 GEO. L.J. 1659, 1668 (1991) (―This desire for 
subordination, rather than aversion, may be a greater part of discrimination against women than 
against racial minorities. Sexist men do not, as a general rule, try to avoid all contact with women. On 
the contrary, they desire contact in certain subordinating forms, such as having women as secretaries 
and dependent wives. In contrast, many whites would prefer to avoid all contact with African 
Americans . . . .‖); Elizabeth F. Emens, Intimate Discrimination: The State’s Role in the Accidents of 
Sex and Love, 122 HARV. L. REV. 1307, 1335–36 (2009) (quoting Mary Becker). 
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